The Kartarpur Sahib Corridor, which has materialised against all odds, is a political enigma. Some see it as a ray of hope amidst the darkness that has enveloped India-Pakistan ties. For others, it is very much part of the problem that afflicts the bilateral relationship. The divergence cuts across the political divide.
For former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the corridor could be a harbinger of improved relations between Delhi and Islamabad. But his party colleague and chief minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh, had consistently drawn attention to the possibility that the initiative is part of Pakistan‘s longstanding interest in stoking Sikh separatism.
On its part, Delhi has extended strong support to the construction of the four-kilometre corridor connecting GurdwaraDera Baba Nanak on the Indian side and GurudwaraDarbar Sahib at Kartarpur across the border. But there is no hiding the wariness in the Indian security establishment about Pakistan‘s sudden enthusiasm for the corridor that it was unwilling to consider in the past.
While some in Rawalpindi might want to use the Kartarpur corridor to play the Khalistan card, Delhi must focus on the possibility of strengthening what unites the people of the province — the idea of Punjabiyat. Since the late 1990s, the governments led by AtalBihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh in Delhi, as well as the Congress and Akali governments — led respectively by Amarinder Singh and Parkash Singh Badal, have actively sought to develop economic and cultural cooperation across the
[1] that divides the two Punjabs.
There were moments in the last two decades when these initiatives appeared very close to fruition. The plans included the expansion of the scope of overland trade at the Attari-W agah border, facilitating hydrocarbon and electricity exports from the Indian Punjab to Pakistan and expanding cultural contacts.
That Rawalpindi seemed to pull the plug each time might suggest that the prospects to advance cooperation between the two Punjabs is limited. Even as he lauds the corridor as a new beginning in bilateral relations, Imran Khan insists that the resolution of Kashmir is critical for normalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries.
But, the fact that the Kartarpur corridor has been realised despite Pakistan‘s traditional logic on the relationship with India, should encourage Delhi to reconsider initiatives to promote cooperation across the [1]. Even more important, Delhi must look beyond the formal dialogue with Islamabad and the para diplomacy between Chandigarh and Lahore.
Which of the following is true of Kartarpur, the town?

The Kartarpur Sahib Corridor, which has materialised against all odds, is a political enigma. Some see it as a ray of hope amidst the darkness that has enveloped India-Pakistan ties. For others, it is very much part of the problem that afflicts the bilateral relationship. The divergence cuts across the political divide.
For former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the corridor could be a harbinger of improved relations between Delhi and Islamabad. But his party colleague and chief minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh, had consistently drawn attention to the possibility that the initiative is part of Pakistan‘s longstanding interest in stoking Sikh separatism.
On its part, Delhi has extended strong support to the construction of the four-kilometre corridor connecting GurdwaraDera Baba Nanak on the Indian side and GurudwaraDarbar Sahib at Kartarpur across the border. But there is no hiding the wariness in the Indian security establishment about Pakistan‘s sudden enthusiasm for the corridor that it was unwilling to consider in the past.
While some in Rawalpindi might want to use the Kartarpur corridor to play the Khalistan card, Delhi must focus on the possibility of strengthening what unites the people of the province — the idea of Punjabiyat. Since the late 1990s, the governments led by AtalBihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh in Delhi, as well as the Congress and Akali governments — led respectively by Amarinder Singh and Parkash Singh Badal, have actively sought to develop economic and cultural cooperation across the
[1] that divides the two Punjabs.
There were moments in the last two decades when these initiatives appeared very close to fruition. The plans included the expansion of the scope of overland trade at the Attari-W agah border, facilitating hydrocarbon and electricity exports from the Indian Punjab to Pakistan and expanding cultural contacts.
That Rawalpindi seemed to pull the plug each time might suggest that the prospects to advance cooperation between the two Punjabs is limited. Even as he lauds the corridor as a new beginning in bilateral relations, Imran Khan insists that the resolution of Kashmir is critical for normalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries.
But, the fact that the Kartarpur corridor has been realised despite Pakistan‘s traditional logic on the relationship with India, should encourage Delhi to reconsider initiatives to promote cooperation across the [1]. Even more important, Delhi must look beyond the formal dialogue with Islamabad and the para diplomacy between Chandigarh and Lahore.
The Kartarpur corridor is:

The Kartarpur Sahib Corridor, which has materialised against all odds, is a political enigma. Some see it as a ray of hope amidst the darkness that has enveloped India-Pakistan ties. For others, it is very much part of the problem that afflicts the bilateral relationship. The divergence cuts across the political divide.
For former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the corridor could be a harbinger of improved relations between Delhi and Islamabad. But his party colleague and chief minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh, had consistently drawn attention to the possibility that the initiative is part of Pakistan‘s longstanding interest in stoking Sikh separatism.
On its part, Delhi has extended strong support to the construction of the four-kilometre corridor connecting GurdwaraDera Baba Nanak on the Indian side and GurudwaraDarbar Sahib at Kartarpur across the border. But there is no hiding the wariness in the Indian security establishment about Pakistan‘s sudden enthusiasm for the corridor that it was unwilling to consider in the past.
While some in Rawalpindi might want to use the Kartarpur corridor to play the Khalistan card, Delhi must focus on the possibility of strengthening what unites the people of the province — the idea of Punjabiyat. Since the late 1990s, the governments led by AtalBihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh in Delhi, as well as the Congress and Akali governments — led respectively by Amarinder Singh and Parkash Singh Badal, have actively sought to develop economic and cultural cooperation across the
[1] that divides the two Punjabs.
There were moments in the last two decades when these initiatives appeared very close to fruition. The plans included the expansion of the scope of overland trade at the Attari-W agah border, facilitating hydrocarbon and electricity exports from the Indian Punjab to Pakistan and expanding cultural contacts.
That Rawalpindi seemed to pull the plug each time might suggest that the prospects to advance cooperation between the two Punjabs is limited. Even as he lauds the corridor as a new beginning in bilateral relations, Imran Khan insists that the resolution of Kashmir is critical for normalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries.
But, the fact that the Kartarpur corridor has been realised despite Pakistan‘s traditional logic on the relationship with India, should encourage Delhi to reconsider initiatives to promote cooperation across the [1]. Even more important, Delhi must look beyond the formal dialogue with Islamabad and the para diplomacy between Chandigarh and Lahore.
The line between the two Punjabs replaced by [1] is the

The Kartarpur Sahib Corridor, which has materialised against all odds, is a political enigma. Some see it as a ray of hope amidst the darkness that has enveloped India-Pakistan ties. For others, it is very much part of the problem that afflicts the bilateral relationship. The divergence cuts across the political divide.
For former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the corridor could be a harbinger of improved relations between Delhi and Islamabad. But his party colleague and chief minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh, had consistently drawn attention to the possibility that the initiative is part of Pakistan‘s longstanding interest in stoking Sikh separatism.
On its part, Delhi has extended strong support to the construction of the four-kilometre corridor connecting GurdwaraDera Baba Nanak on the Indian side and GurudwaraDarbar Sahib at Kartarpur across the border. But there is no hiding the wariness in the Indian security establishment about Pakistan‘s sudden enthusiasm for the corridor that it was unwilling to consider in the past.
While some in Rawalpindi might want to use the Kartarpur corridor to play the Khalistan card, Delhi must focus on the possibility of strengthening what unites the people of the province — the idea of Punjabiyat. Since the late 1990s, the governments led by AtalBihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh in Delhi, as well as the Congress and Akali governments — led respectively by Amarinder Singh and Parkash Singh Badal, have actively sought to develop economic and cultural cooperation across the
[1] that divides the two Punjabs.
There were moments in the last two decades when these initiatives appeared very close to fruition. The plans included the expansion of the scope of overland trade at the Attari-W agah border, facilitating hydrocarbon and electricity exports from the Indian Punjab to Pakistan and expanding cultural contacts.
That Rawalpindi seemed to pull the plug each time might suggest that the prospects to advance cooperation between the two Punjabs is limited. Even as he lauds the corridor as a new beginning in bilateral relations, Imran Khan insists that the resolution of Kashmir is critical for normalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries.
But, the fact that the Kartarpur corridor has been realised despite Pakistan‘s traditional logic on the relationship with India, should encourage Delhi to reconsider initiatives to promote cooperation across the [1]. Even more important, Delhi must look beyond the formal dialogue with Islamabad and the para diplomacy between Chandigarh and Lahore.
The Khalistan movement was:

The Kartarpur Sahib Corridor, which has materialised against all odds, is a political enigma. Some see it as a ray of hope amidst the darkness that has enveloped India-Pakistan ties. For others, it is very much part of the problem that afflicts the bilateral relationship. The divergence cuts across the political divide.
For former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the corridor could be a harbinger of improved relations between Delhi and Islamabad. But his party colleague and chief minister of Punjab, Amarinder Singh, had consistently drawn attention to the possibility that the initiative is part of Pakistan‘s longstanding interest in stoking Sikh separatism.
On its part, Delhi has extended strong support to the construction of the four-kilometre corridor connecting GurdwaraDera Baba Nanak on the Indian side and GurudwaraDarbar Sahib at Kartarpur across the border. But there is no hiding the wariness in the Indian security establishment about Pakistan‘s sudden enthusiasm for the corridor that it was unwilling to consider in the past.
While some in Rawalpindi might want to use the Kartarpur corridor to play the Khalistan card, Delhi must focus on the possibility of strengthening what unites the people of the province — the idea of Punjabiyat. Since the late 1990s, the governments led by AtalBihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh in Delhi, as well as the Congress and Akali governments — led respectively by Amarinder Singh and Parkash Singh Badal, have actively sought to develop economic and cultural cooperation across the
[1] that divides the two Punjabs.
There were moments in the last two decades when these initiatives appeared very close to fruition. The plans included the expansion of the scope of overland trade at the Attari-W agah border, facilitating hydrocarbon and electricity exports from the Indian Punjab to Pakistan and expanding cultural contacts.
That Rawalpindi seemed to pull the plug each time might suggest that the prospects to advance cooperation between the two Punjabs is limited. Even as he lauds the corridor as a new beginning in bilateral relations, Imran Khan insists that the resolution of Kashmir is critical for normalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries.
But, the fact that the Kartarpur corridor has been realised despite Pakistan‘s traditional logic on the relationship with India, should encourage Delhi to reconsider initiatives to promote cooperation across the [1]. Even more important, Delhi must look beyond the formal dialogue with Islamabad and the para diplomacy between Chandigarh and Lahore.
If Afghanistan is considered as sharing a land border with India (in the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir region), how many countries does India share its land borders with in total (including Afghanistan)?

On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees.
The name of the tribe that is discussed in the passage above, and who are also known as the‗Reang‘, has been replaced with ‗[1]‘ in the passage above. What is ‗[1]‘?

On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees.
On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees.
The name of the state where the displaced [1] refugees have now been allowed to settle permanently according to the pact signed on 16 January 2020 has been replaced with ‗[2]‘ in the passage above. What is ‗[2]‘?

On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees.
What is the name of the Act, passed in 1958 and applied to several states in northeast India, which allows special powers to the Indian Armed Forces to maintain public order in ―disturbed areas‖, and which was recently partially withdrawn from some areas?

On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees.
This person went on a 16-year-long hunger strike to demand the abolition of the Act mentioned in the previous question. What is this person‘s name?

On 16 January 2020, displaced [1] tribals from Mizoram, living as refugees in [2] since 1997, were allowed to permanently settle in [2]. The agreement, allowing 30,000 [1] tribals to permanently settle in [2], took 20 years and nine attempts in the making, and was signed between the Centre, the state governments of [2] and Mizoram, and [1]-Reang representatives in the national capital in the presence of union home minister Amit Shah.
The [1]-spread across [2], Mizoram and parts of southern Assam-are the most populous tribe in [2]. Also known as Reangs in the state, they are ethnically different from the Mizos, with their own distinct language and dialect and form one of the 21 scheduled tribes of [2].
In 1997, roughly half the [1] population fled to [2], following violent clashes with the Mizo population, which led to the [1]s‘ demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC), under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution, in western Mizoram, where they were the more dominant lot, outnumbering the ethnic Mizo population.
On 1 October, as the Centre‘s ninth repatriation attempt began, the tribe‘s food and cash supply was stopped – prompting the tribe to take to the streets. On 3 October, the union home ministry started a round of talks with the state governments of Mizoram and [2] to legitimize the 30,000-odd refugees
This person signed the ‗[1] Merger Agreement‘ on September 9, 1949, as a result of which ‗[1]‘ became a part of India on October 15, 1949. W ho is this person?