Legal Reasoning Quiz Set – 2

The pandemic had turned the world on its head. No aspect of life has escaped unscathed. This includes the functioning of courts and tribunals. The judiciary has limited its work to hearing urgent matters via video conferencing. A lot has been written about how this is an opportunity to improve IT infrastructure of courts so that they can move to video conference hearings as the norm. However, any such move without first revamping procedural law would be futile.
In subordinate civil court and High Courts, a significant time of daily proceedings is
aken up by cases where only adjournments are sought for procedural matters like filling of replies. Both as a response to this crisis, as well as in the medium term, this system needs to be devised where cases are not listed before the court unless all the documents are filed within strict timelines and every procedural requirement compiled with. The existing infrastructure is enough to enable this. Listing can be done before the court only in cases requiring urgent interim intervention from the court, while the matter is pending procedural completion, after verification of urgency by a judicial officer or a judge upon oral or written application.
When courts reopen, apart from fresh cases, only a limited number of cases (say-20-30 a day) which are ripe for arguments can be posted. This can be done with sufficient notice to the Bar Associations that requests for adjournments will be looked at askance. This will ensure that court rooms are not crowded. Circulations of the cases to be listed in advance (say, two weeks before listing) will give advocates enough time to take instructions from clients and prepare for arguments.
The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 should amend provisions pertaining to Special Leave Petitions (SLPs). Article 136 of the Constitution enables people to file a petition seeking leave to appeal a decision of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court grants leave to appeal if the petition raises a question of law of general public importance, or if the judgment appealed against is especially perverse, which would require interference from the Court. The provision has been abused over the years to only clog the docket of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was never intended to be a court of appeal, barring such appeals which specific statutes provide for. The High Courts are usually meant to be the final courts of appeal. Instead, SLPs are now being treated as the last round of appeal.
Reports show that SLPs comprise about 60-70% of the Supreme Court’s docket. Out of this, 80-90 % of SLPs are dismissed, which means only 10-20% of such cases raise important questions of law. This takes up a lot of time of the Court. A simple solution would be to do away with immediate oral hearing of SLPs. The Supreme Court Rules could be amended to provide for a structure of pre-hearing of SLPs. Every SLP must be accompanied by an application for oral hearing which must be decided first by the Court, and that too in chambers. To assist the Court for that, a cadre of judicial research assistants made up of qualified lawyers should be created. The research assistants can go through each SLP and cull out the important questions of law as envisioned in Article 136.

The author suggests what remedy apart from improving IT infrastructure of the courts in order to reduce pendency and delay?

The pandemic had turned the world on its head. No aspect of life has escaped unscathed. This includes the functioning of courts and tribunals. The judiciary has limited its work to hearing urgent matters via video conferencing. A lot has been written about how this is an opportunity to improve IT infrastructure of courts so that they can move to video conference hearings as the norm. However, any such move without first revamping procedural law would be futile.
In subordinate civil court and High Courts, a significant time of daily proceedings is
aken up by cases where only adjournments are sought for procedural matters like filling of replies. Both as a response to this crisis, as well as in the medium term, this system needs to be devised where cases are not listed before the court unless all the documents are filed within strict timelines and every procedural requirement compiled with. The existing infrastructure is enough to enable this. Listing can be done before the court only in cases requiring urgent interim intervention from the court, while the matter is pending procedural completion, after verification of urgency by a judicial officer or a judge upon oral or written application.
When courts reopen, apart from fresh cases, only a limited number of cases (say-20-30 a day) which are ripe for arguments can be posted. This can be done with sufficient notice to the Bar Associations that requests for adjournments will be looked at askance. This will ensure that court rooms are not crowded. Circulations of the cases to be listed in advance (say, two weeks before listing) will give advocates enough time to take instructions from clients and prepare for arguments.
The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 should amend provisions pertaining to Special Leave Petitions (SLPs). Article 136 of the Constitution enables people to file a petition seeking leave to appeal a decision of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court grants leave to appeal if the petition raises a question of law of general public importance, or if the judgment appealed against is especially perverse, which would require interference from the Court. The provision has been abused over the years to only clog the docket of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was never intended to be a court of appeal, barring such appeals which specific statutes provide for. The High Courts are usually meant to be the final courts of appeal. Instead, SLPs are now being treated as the last round of appeal.
Reports show that SLPs comprise about 60-70% of the Supreme Court’s docket. Out of this, 80-90 % of SLPs are dismissed, which means only 10-20% of such cases raise important questions of law. This takes up a lot of time of the Court. A simple solution would be to do away with immediate oral hearing of SLPs. The Supreme Court Rules could be amended to provide for a structure of pre-hearing of SLPs. Every SLP must be accompanied by an application for oral hearing which must be decided first by the Court, and that too in chambers. To assist the Court for that, a cadre of judicial research assistants made up of qualified lawyers should be created. The research assistants can go through each SLP and cull out the important questions of law as envisioned in Article 136.

Mrs Sharma’s lawyer Mr Singh filed a petition in the family court requiring maintenance from her separated husband under section 125 of CrPC. The matter was pertaining to another jurisdiction out of the state and therefore the file was rejected. Which statement from the passage mentions delay caused by such illicit filing of the case.

The pandemic had turned the world on its head. No aspect of life has escaped unscathed. This includes the functioning of courts and tribunals. The judiciary has limited its work to hearing urgent matters via video conferencing. A lot has been written about how this is an opportunity to improve IT infrastructure of courts so that they can move to video conference hearings as the norm. However, any such move without first revamping procedural law would be futile.
In subordinate civil court and High Courts, a significant time of daily proceedings is
aken up by cases where only adjournments are sought for procedural matters like filling of replies. Both as a response to this crisis, as well as in the medium term, this system needs to be devised where cases are not listed before the court unless all the documents are filed within strict timelines and every procedural requirement compiled with. The existing infrastructure is enough to enable this. Listing can be done before the court only in cases requiring urgent interim intervention from the court, while the matter is pending procedural completion, after verification of urgency by a judicial officer or a judge upon oral or written application.
When courts reopen, apart from fresh cases, only a limited number of cases (say-20-30 a day) which are ripe for arguments can be posted. This can be done with sufficient notice to the Bar Associations that requests for adjournments will be looked at askance. This will ensure that court rooms are not crowded. Circulations of the cases to be listed in advance (say, two weeks before listing) will give advocates enough time to take instructions from clients and prepare for arguments.
The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 should amend provisions pertaining to Special Leave Petitions (SLPs). Article 136 of the Constitution enables people to file a petition seeking leave to appeal a decision of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court grants leave to appeal if the petition raises a question of law of general public importance, or if the judgment appealed against is especially perverse, which would require interference from the Court. The provision has been abused over the years to only clog the docket of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was never intended to be a court of appeal, barring such appeals which specific statutes provide for. The High Courts are usually meant to be the final courts of appeal. Instead, SLPs are now being treated as the last round of appeal.
Reports show that SLPs comprise about 60-70% of the Supreme Court’s docket. Out of this, 80-90 % of SLPs are dismissed, which means only 10-20% of such cases raise important questions of law. This takes up a lot of time of the Court. A simple solution would be to do away with immediate oral hearing of SLPs. The Supreme Court Rules could be amended to provide for a structure of pre-hearing of SLPs. Every SLP must be accompanied by an application for oral hearing which must be decided first by the Court, and that too in chambers. To assist the Court for that, a cadre of judicial research assistants made up of qualified lawyers should be created. The research assistants can go through each SLP and cull out the important questions of law as envisioned in Article 136.

Mr. Ramu a government teacher was ordered to vacate his job as he did not enroll for advanced teaching course by the school. Mr. Ramu appealed in the high court citing injustice but of no success. What provision Mr. Ramu is entitled to pertaining to the passage?

The pandemic had turned the world on its head. No aspect of life has escaped unscathed. This includes the functioning of courts and tribunals. The judiciary has limited its work to hearing urgent matters via video conferencing. A lot has been written about how this is an opportunity to improve IT infrastructure of courts so that they can move to video conference hearings as the norm. However, any such move without first revamping procedural law would be futile.
In subordinate civil court and High Courts, a significant time of daily proceedings is
aken up by cases where only adjournments are sought for procedural matters like filling of replies. Both as a response to this crisis, as well as in the medium term, this system needs to be devised where cases are not listed before the court unless all the documents are filed within strict timelines and every procedural requirement compiled with. The existing infrastructure is enough to enable this. Listing can be done before the court only in cases requiring urgent interim intervention from the court, while the matter is pending procedural completion, after verification of urgency by a judicial officer or a judge upon oral or written application.
When courts reopen, apart from fresh cases, only a limited number of cases (say-20-30 a day) which are ripe for arguments can be posted. This can be done with sufficient notice to the Bar Associations that requests for adjournments will be looked at askance. This will ensure that court rooms are not crowded. Circulations of the cases to be listed in advance (say, two weeks before listing) will give advocates enough time to take instructions from clients and prepare for arguments.
The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 should amend provisions pertaining to Special Leave Petitions (SLPs). Article 136 of the Constitution enables people to file a petition seeking leave to appeal a decision of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court grants leave to appeal if the petition raises a question of law of general public importance, or if the judgment appealed against is especially perverse, which would require interference from the Court. The provision has been abused over the years to only clog the docket of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was never intended to be a court of appeal, barring such appeals which specific statutes provide for. The High Courts are usually meant to be the final courts of appeal. Instead, SLPs are now being treated as the last round of appeal.
Reports show that SLPs comprise about 60-70% of the Supreme Court’s docket. Out of this, 80-90 % of SLPs are dismissed, which means only 10-20% of such cases raise important questions of law. This takes up a lot of time of the Court. A simple solution would be to do away with immediate oral hearing of SLPs. The Supreme Court Rules could be amended to provide for a structure of pre-hearing of SLPs. Every SLP must be accompanied by an application for oral hearing which must be decided first by the Court, and that too in chambers. To assist the Court for that, a cadre of judicial research assistants made up of qualified lawyers should be created. The research assistants can go through each SLP and cull out the important questions of law as envisioned in Article 136.

The author cites remedies for delays caused by SLPs in the apex court. Which statement/statements from the passage cite those remedies?

Article 15(2) stipulates that citizens shall not on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of religion , race , caste, sex, or place of birth be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment. Yet, on occasion, this right, which applies horizontally, inter se individuals, comes into conflict with the rights of persons to associate with others, often to the exclusion of certain groups. This is why every time a case of
discrimination is brought, the party that discriminates claims that he possesses a liberty to do, that he must be free to act according to his own sense of conscience.
The Supreme Court, in 2005, in Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others, endorsed one such restrictive bond, when it ruled in favour of a bye-law of a Parsi housing society that prohibited the sale of property to non- Parsis. This right to forbid such a sale, the Court ruled, was intrinsic in the Parsis’ fundamental right to associate with each other. But in holding thus, the judgment, as Gautam Bhatia points out in his book, Th Transformative Constitution, not only conflated the freedom to contract with the constitutional freedom to associate, but also overlooked altogether Article 15(2).
At first blush, Article 15(2) might appear to be somewhat limited in scope. But the word “shops” used in it is meant to be read widely. A study of the Constituent Assembly’s debates on the clause’s framing shows us that the founders explicitly intended to place restrictions on any economic activity that sought to exclude specific groups. For example, when a person refuses to lease her property to another based on the customer’s faith, such a refusal would run directly counter to the guarantee of equality.
An overruling of the verdict in Zoroastrian Cooperative, while desirable, in unlikely, however, to serve as a panacea. India is unique among democracies in that a constitutional right to equality is not supported by comprehensive legislation. In South Africa, for example, a constitutional guarantee is augmented by and all- encompassing law which prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the government but also by private organisation and individuals.

According to the passage which of the following feature lacks in Indian Legal System.

Article 15(2) stipulates that citizens shall not on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of religion , race , caste, sex, or place of birth be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment. Yet, on occasion, this right, which applies horizontally, inter se individuals, comes into conflict with the rights of persons to associate with others, often to the exclusion of certain groups. This is why every time a case of
discrimination is brought, the party that discriminates claims that he possesses a liberty to do, that he must be free to act according to his own sense of conscience.
The Supreme Court, in 2005, in Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others, endorsed one such restrictive bond, when it ruled in favour of a bye-law of a Parsi housing society that prohibited the sale of property to non- Parsis. This right to forbid such a sale, the Court ruled, was intrinsic in the Parsis’ fundamental right to associate with each other. But in holding thus, the judgment, as Gautam Bhatia points out in his book, Th Transformative Constitution, not only conflated the freedom to contract with the constitutional freedom to associate, but also overlooked altogether Article 15(2).
At first blush, Article 15(2) might appear to be somewhat limited in scope. But the word “shops” used in it is meant to be read widely. A study of the Constituent Assembly’s debates on the clause’s framing shows us that the founders explicitly intended to place restrictions on any economic activity that sought to exclude specific groups. For example, when a person refuses to lease her property to another based on the customer’s faith, such a refusal would run directly counter to the guarantee of equality.
An overruling of the verdict in Zoroastrian Cooperative, while desirable, in unlikely, however, to serve as a panacea. India is unique among democracies in that a constitutional right to equality is not supported by comprehensive legislation. In South Africa, for example, a constitutional guarantee is augmented by and all- encompassing law which prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the government but also by private organisation and individuals.
Mr. Sanghvi an owner of real estate refuses to lease the office space for rent to Mr. Adil on pretext of his faith.

According to the passage which of the following statement should have placed a sense of remedy for the discrimination of Mr. Adil ?

Article 15(2) stipulates that citizens shall not on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of religion , race , caste, sex, or place of birth be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment. Yet, on occasion, this right, which applies horizontally, inter se individuals, comes into conflict with the rights of persons to associate with others, often to the exclusion of certain groups. This is why every time a case of
discrimination is brought, the party that discriminates claims that he possesses a liberty to do, that he must be free to act according to his own sense of conscience.
The Supreme Court, in 2005, in Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others, endorsed one such restrictive bond, when it ruled in favour of a bye-law of a Parsi housing society that prohibited the sale of property to non- Parsis. This right to forbid such a sale, the Court ruled, was intrinsic in the Parsis’ fundamental right to associate with each other. But in holding thus, the judgment, as Gautam Bhatia points out in his book, Th Transformative Constitution, not only conflated the freedom to contract with the constitutional freedom to associate, but also overlooked altogether Article 15(2).
At first blush, Article 15(2) might appear to be somewhat limited in scope. But the word “shops” used in it is meant to be read widely. A study of the Constituent Assembly’s debates on the clause’s framing shows us that the founders explicitly intended to place restrictions on any economic activity that sought to exclude specific groups. For example, when a person refuses to lease her property to another based on the customer’s faith, such a refusal would run directly counter to the guarantee of equality.
An overruling of the verdict in Zoroastrian Cooperative, while desirable, in unlikely, however, to serve as a panacea. India is unique among democracies in that a constitutional right to equality is not supported by comprehensive legislation. In South Africa, for example, a constitutional guarantee is augmented by and all- encompassing law which prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the government but also by private organisation and individuals.

What verdict Supreme Court gave in the Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others?

Article 15(2) stipulates that citizens shall not on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of religion , race , caste, sex, or place of birth be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment. Yet, on occasion, this right, which applies horizontally, inter se individuals, comes into conflict with the rights of persons to associate with others, often to the exclusion of certain groups. This is why every time a case of
discrimination is brought, the party that discriminates claims that he possesses a liberty to do, that he must be free to act according to his own sense of conscience.
The Supreme Court, in 2005, in Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others, endorsed one such restrictive bond, when it ruled in favour of a bye-law of a Parsi housing society that prohibited the sale of property to non- Parsis. This right to forbid such a sale, the Court ruled, was intrinsic in the Parsis’ fundamental right to associate with each other. But in holding thus, the judgment, as Gautam Bhatia points out in his book, Th Transformative Constitution, not only conflated the freedom to contract with the constitutional freedom to associate, but also overlooked altogether Article 15(2).
At first blush, Article 15(2) might appear to be somewhat limited in scope. But the word “shops” used in it is meant to be read widely. A study of the Constituent Assembly’s debates on the clause’s framing shows us that the founders explicitly intended to place restrictions on any economic activity that sought to exclude specific groups. For example, when a person refuses to lease her property to another based on the customer’s faith, such a refusal would run directly counter to the guarantee of equality.
An overruling of the verdict in Zoroastrian Cooperative, while desirable, in unlikely, however, to serve as a panacea. India is unique among democracies in that a constitutional right to equality is not supported by comprehensive legislation. In South Africa, for example, a constitutional guarantee is augmented by and all- encompassing law which prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the government but also by private organisation and individuals.

Why the author believes that Article 15(2) has limited scope?

Article 15(2) stipulates that citizens shall not on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of religion , race , caste, sex, or place of birth be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment. Yet, on occasion, this right, which applies horizontally, inter se individuals, comes into conflict with the rights of persons to associate with others, often to the exclusion of certain groups. This is why every time a case of
discrimination is brought, the party that discriminates claims that he possesses a liberty to do, that he must be free to act according to his own sense of conscience.
The Supreme Court, in 2005, in Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society vs District Register Co-operative Societies (Urban) and Others, endorsed one such restrictive bond, when it ruled in favour of a bye-law of a Parsi housing society that prohibited the sale of property to non- Parsis. This right to forbid such a sale, the Court ruled, was intrinsic in the Parsis’ fundamental right to associate with each other. But in holding thus, the judgment, as Gautam Bhatia points out in his book, Th Transformative Constitution, not only conflated the freedom to contract with the constitutional freedom to associate, but also overlooked altogether Article 15(2).
At first blush, Article 15(2) might appear to be somewhat limited in scope. But the word “shops” used in it is meant to be read widely. A study of the Constituent Assembly’s debates on the clause’s framing shows us that the founders explicitly intended to place restrictions on any economic activity that sought to exclude specific groups. For example, when a person refuses to lease her property to another based on the customer’s faith, such a refusal would run directly counter to the guarantee of equality.
An overruling of the verdict in Zoroastrian Cooperative, while desirable, in unlikely, however, to serve as a panacea. India is unique among democracies in that a constitutional right to equality is not supported by comprehensive legislation. In South Africa, for example, a constitutional guarantee is augmented by and all- encompassing law which prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the government but also by private organisation and individuals.

Why India is unique with respect to other democracies according to the author?

Hours after India went into lockdown, the Finance Minister announced a slew of measures to alleviate the economic crisis. This included proposed changes to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, a law enacted to bring about smooth and quick resolutions for companies facing insolvency and bankruptcy with a view to primarily avoiding liquidation. The government, the Minister said, was considering suspension of certain provisions of the IBC which enabled creditors to file insolvency petitions against Indian companies for a years’ time beyond April 30. April 30 came and went without any announcement in this regard.

In mid-May, the Finance Minister announced that the government was planning to bring in an ordinance to suspend provisions enabling filing of fresh insolvency cases for a period of one year. This was followed by absolute silence on the modalities or mechanism of suspension of the provisions. Banks, financial institutions (FIs), and insolvency law practitioners had no idea where they stood with these announcements. Finally, on June 5, the government promulgated an ordinance which inserted Section 10A in the IBC. The government said the ordinance was promulgated because the lockdown has caused business disruptions which may lead to default on debts pushing such companies into insolvency. Therefore, if felt that suspending Sections 7, 9 and 10 of the IBC would be the right course of action.

Towards that end ,Section 10 A provides that “no application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor shall be filed, for any default arising on or after 25th March,2020 for a period of six months or such further period, not exceeding one year from this period, as may be notified in this behalf”. This means that these provisions shall
remain suspended from March 25 till September 25, unless extended for another six months, which would extend the suspension up till March 25,2021.

However, the provision to the section states that no application for insolvency resolution shall ever be filed against a corporate debtor for any default occurring during the suspension period. While the main Section 10A suspends such applications for a limited period, the proviso enlarges the scope to provide complete amnesty under the IBC for any default occurring during such period. The role of a proviso in a statute is to restrict the application of the main provision under exceptional circumstances. However, the proviso expands the substantive provision in the main section. Further, if the main provision is unclear, a proviso may be given to explain its true meaning. In this case the main provision appears clear, only to be obfuscated by the proviso. The proviso therefore does not appear to be legally tenable .As creditors can still approach courts, and as banks/Fis can still approach Debt Recovery Tribunals, the protection given by this proviso seems illusory.

Which of the following statements clearly explain the ordinance inserting article 10A in the IBC?